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The objects for sale in most auctions display both private and common value characteristics.
This salient feature of many real-world auctions has not yet been incorporated into a strategic
analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior. This paper reports such an analysis in the context of
a stylized model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common
value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value results in lower efficiency
and higher profits for the winning bidder. Information provided by the auctioneer decreases
uncertainty, which improves efficiency and increases the seller’s revenue. These positive effects
of public information disclosure are stronger the more precise the information. Efficiency and
revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction. Since our model nests both the
private and common value case it may lead to an improved specification of empirical models of
auctions.
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Auctions have traditionally been divided into two categories. In private value auctions,
bidders know their own value for the commodity with certainty but are unsure about others’
valuations. Vickrey (1961) provides an early strategic analysis of private value auctions for the
case when values are independent across bidders. The standard textbook example associated with
his model is the selling of a painting; buyers’ valuations for the painting may differ but are
assumed to be independent. In contrast, common value auctions pertain to situations in which
the object for sale is worth the same to everyone, but bidders have different private information
about its true value. A well known example where the common value setup applies is the
auctioning of oil drilling rights, which, to a first approximation, are worth the same to all
competing bidders. Common value models were introduced by Wilson (1969, 1977) who also
provided the first equilibrium analysis of the winner’s curse. See Klemperer (1999) for a
comprehensive survey of this early literature and more recent advances in auction theory.
Most auctions, however, are not exclusively common value or private value. In his
extensive survey of empirical studies on auctions, Laffont (1997) concludes: "In general,
economic theory is not able to tell us in which particular model we are. Most empirical studies
clearly involve some private value element as well as some common value element ..." For
instance, when a painting is auctioned to a private collector, it may be resold in the future and
the resale price will be the same for all bidders. This adds a common value component to the
auction. And in the oil drilling example, private value differences may arise when a superior
technology enables some firms to exploit the rights better than others.
This paper develops a model in which bidders’ information consists of both private and
common value components. Our stylized two-signal model nests the two paradigms of auction
theory in the simplest possible way. The main focus of this paper is on a strategic analysis (à
la Vickrey and Wilson): we derive the equilibrium bidding functions for our model and make
explicit how they vary with the private and common value signals. Our analysis generates
insights about efficiency, winner’s profit, and revenues in auctions with private and common
value elements, insights that could not have been obtained from a private or common value
model alone.
For example, in the absence of reserve prices and entry fees, efficiency is not an issue in
(symmetric) private or common value auctions. In the independent private values context, for2
instance, Vickrey (1961) has shown that optimal bids are increasing in bidders’ values, and
hence, the object is awarded to the bidder that values it the most. And in common value
auctions, all bidders value the object the same, so any allocation rule is (trivially) efficient.
However, when bidders possess both private and common value information, inefficiencies should
be expected. The intuition for this result is straightforward: a bidder with a moderate private
value and an overly optimistic estimate of the common value may outbid a rival with a superior
private value but more realistic conjectures about the common value.
Maskin (1992) first pointed out that auctions may result in inefficient allocations when
signals are multi-dimensional, a result that has been generalized by Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999)
by allowing for allocative externalities. Dasgupta and Maskin (1999) also extend Maskin’s
earlier work and show that a generalized Vickrey auction provides a "second best" mechanism
in the sense that it is "constrained efficient." An interesting related paper is that of Pesendorfer
and Swinkels (1999). In the context of a two-signal, uniform price auction, they derive
conditions under which efficiency is restored when the number of bidders becomes large. None
of these papers, however, contains a strategic analysis. Dasgupta and Maskin and Jehiel and
Moldovanu prove their results using mechanism design arguments without characterizing the
optimal bidding functions. Such a characterization is also lacking in Pesendorfer and Swinkels
(1999), who remark that "As a consequence of the two-dimensional type space we have not been
able to prove existence of equilibrium. Our results instead hinge on a partial characterization of
what equilibria must look like in the limit, if they exist." Existence in their setup is not
guaranteed, however, as Jackson’s (1999) counterexample shows.
In contrast, we explicitly derive the equilibrium for our model, which makes it possible
to determine the extent of inefficiency that can result from the use of auctions. We show that
more uncertainty about the common value implies a higher level of expected inefficiency. In the
limit when the uncertainty about the common value is so large as to override the private value
information, auctions are no more efficient than a random allocation rule. In the other extreme
when there is no uncertainty about the common value at all, the auction reduces to an efficient
private value auction. Interestingly, the profit of the winning bidder is higher with more
uncertainty. The intuition is that, with more uncertainty, bidding has to be more cautious to
avoid the winner’s curse, which leads to higher profits for the winning bidder.3
The observation that more uncertainty about the object’s value results in more inefficiency
has implications for the auctioning of (government) licenses to operate in a market. The cost
structure of bidding firms constitutes a private value element in such cases, while the uncertain
demand for the consumer products introduces a common value aspect. The efficiency losses that
can be expected in these situations may be lessened when firms repeatedly participate in similar
auctions, since this provides them with the opportunity to learn about consumer demand. For
instance, vendor locations at fairs are often auctioned on an annual basis which enables bidders
to accumulate information about demand over time. Consequently, the common value of the
location can be determined more precisely, thereby reducing possible efficiency losses. In
contrast, the infrequent auctioning of landing slots at airports involves more uncertainty about
the common value, since bidders face the difficult task of predicting consumer demand for a
longer period. The FCC auctions used to allocate the spectrum provide another example where
the uncertainty about the common value aspect is likely to be large. First, these auctions are held
infrequently. Second, estimating demand is even more complicated when the frequencies are
used in emerging markets like the market for mobile phones. As a result, efficiency losses may
be more pronounced.
Another benefit of our strategic analysis is that it is possible to evaluate policies to
enhance efficiency and revenues. One such measure is the disclosure of the auctioneer’s
information about the common value. When this information is made public, uncertainty about
the common value decreases, which raises efficiency. On average, the auctioneer’s revenue is
also higher when information is revealed, which makes it likely that such disclosure will indeed
occur. The intuition is that with less uncertainty, bidding will be more aggressive. The positive
effects of publicly announcing the auctioneer’s information are stronger the more precise the
information. Another factor improving efficiency is an increase in competition: expected
efficiency and expected revenue increase with each extra bidder. In the limit when the number
of bidders goes to infinity, an efficient allocation again materializes. Interestingly, the effect of
more competition on efficiency and revenues is stronger than the effect of information provided
by the auctioneer. When the seller has the choice between finding more interested bidders or4
providing information about the value of the commodity, she should choose the former.
1
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In section 3 we
derive the summary statistic and discuss when a reduction to a one-dimensional signal is possible.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium for all standard auctions (first price, second price, and
English) and provides general formulas for the auctioneer’s revenue, the winner’s profit, and total
surplus. In section 5 we show that more uncertainty about the common value results in a higher
level of inefficiency. Section 6 discusses the effect of an auctioneer’s report on revenue and
efficiency, and section 7 considers the effects of increased competition. The results are illustrated
with an example in section 8, and section 9 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider an auction in which n bidders compete for a single object such as a government
contract, drilling rights for an offshore tract, the right to use a certain radio frequency, etc.
Suppose bidder i= 1,...,n, has an unbiased estimate, or common value signal, vi, of the object’s
true value, V, which is the same for all bidders. Two ways to model the common value have
been proposed. In the "traditional" formulation (Rothkopf, 1969; Wilson, 1969, 1977) the
common value has some known prior distribution and bidders’ signals are draws conditional on
the particular realization of V. This realization, unknown at the time of bidding, is revealed when
the object is obtained.
2 Alternatively, the common value can be modeled as the average of
bidders’ signals:
3
1 This result is reminiscent of Bulow and Klemperer’s (1996) finding that an optimally structured bargaining process
following an auction with n bidders generates less revenue than an auction with n+1 bidders.
2 The traditional formulation can be illustrated with the auctioning of oil drilling rights. A (common) prior is
formed as bidders repeatedly compete for different tracts. For each new tract to be auctioned, bidders receive an estimate
of the true amount of oil.
3 Previous papers that have used the average formulation include: Bikhchandani and Riley (1991), Albers and
Harstad (1991), Krishna and Morgan (1997), Klemperer (1998), Bulow and Klemperer (1998), and Bulow, Huang, and
Klemperer (1999). One possible motivation for this formulation is the auctioning of the rights to operate in emerging
markets. In such cases, no prior information exists about the distribution of the common value and residual uncertainty
about the object’s true value is likely to remain after the auction is closed. The best approximation for the value of the
commodity is then its market resale price. For instance, consider a bidder who enters a spectrum auction with the intent
to resell the rights to use the frequency. Prospective buyers will infer others’ value signals from their bids and use this
information to reevaluate the license’s value. Assuming that the ‘quality’ or precision of signals is uniform across bidders,
the best estimate of the resale price of the license is the average of all signals.5
It is important to point out that the two formulations have the same qualitative features. First,
(1)
the commodity for sale is worth the same to all bidders. Second, in both formulations bidders
should realize that winning means that their signal is likely to be too optimistic. In order not to
fall prey to a "winner’s curse," bidders should shade their bids accordingly. By the law of large
numbers the difference between the two formulations disappears completely with an increasing
number of bidders. Throughout the paper we shall use the average formulation for the common
value for which it is possible to derive the equilibrium bidding functions.
Few people would dispute that most auctions have both private and common value
features. For instance, when licenses to operate in a market are auctioned, a common value
aspect results from the uncertain demand for the product to be provided, while the different cost
structures of the bidding firms adds a private value part. This example motivates the information
structure of our model:
4
Assumption 1. There are n ³ 2 risk neutral bidders. Bidder i = 1,...,n receives a private cost
signal, ci, and an independent common value signal, vi. Cost and value signals are assumed to
be independently and identically distributed across bidders.
5
The density of cost signals is denoted by fc(c) with support [cL, cH] where cL³0. Similarly, fv(v)
is the density of value signals, with support [vL, vH]. We consider the case where vL ³ cH, so that
bidders will always wish to participate. The assumption of risk neutrality implies that when
bidder i receives the object and pays an amount b, her net utility is V -ci- b.
4 Obviously, alternative motivations are possible. For instance, the common value signal could pertain to the resale
price of a painting, while the private value signal could represent a bidder’s own taste for the painting. (We will return
to this example in section 8.) Alternatively, in "take-over" battles, the estimated "market value" of the firm could be
represented by the common value signal while the private value indicates the expected "value added" of the bidder.
5 The i.i.d. assumption may seem restrictive but is in no way crucial for the analysis of this paper. In the
conclusion we discuss the case when values and/or costs are affiliated and argue that, with the exception of revenue
equivalence, our results generalize.6
3. From Two to One Dimensions: A Problem?
Before we give a formal derivation of the equilibrium strategies, it is useful to provide
some intuition. When bidders receive multiple signals they must somehow combine the different
pieces of information into a summary statistic since their bid is just a single number. Milgrom
and Weber (1982, p. 1097) point out that "... the derivation of a summary statistic from several
pieces of information is in general a difficult task ..." For our model, however, the summary
statistic follows from the following observation. A bidder’s expected payoff in an auction is:
p
e = (expected gain - expected payment) × probability of winning. The expected payment and
the probability of winning are independent of a bidder’s private and common value signals (but
will depend on her bid and others’ bidding strategies). Moreover, for the average formulation
of the common value, bidder i’s expected gain equals her "surplus," si= vi/n-ci, plus terms that
are independent of her signals.
6 The first-order conditions for profit maximization therefore
determine optimal bids in terms of a her surplus, si.
From a bidder’s point of view, the information contained in the cost and value signals is
thus adequately summarized by a one-dimensional surplus signal. Before applying the standard
apparatus developed for univariate signals, however, we have to deal with the following caveat:
in general, a higher surplus does not imply a higher value signal, and hence, optimal bids may
not be increasing in surplus. This problem is illustrated by the following two-bidder example.
Example 1. Let costs be uniformly distributed on the intervals [0, .5] and [100, 100.5], and let
values be uniformly distributed on [201, 202] and [399, 400]. With two bidders, surplus is given
by s=v/2-c, which is (non-uniformly) distributed on [0, 1], [99, 100], [100, 101] and [199, 200].
Note that 99<s<100 implies 399<v<400, while 100<s<101 implies 201<v<202, so E(v|s)
is not monotonically increasing in s. Now, suppose, in contradiction, that optimal bids are
increasing in surplus and bidder 1, say, has the higher surplus. The expected value of the object
to bidder 1 is given by ½v1+½E(v|s£s 1)-c 1=s 1+½E(v|s£s 1). It is straightforward to show that
E(v|s£100)=300.5 and E(v|s£101)=266.5, so the expected value is 250¼ for s1=100 and 234¼
6 The use of the word surplus for si=vi/n-ci is somewhat misleading since a bidder’s true surplus from the auction
(in case she wins) is V - ci. A bidder’s "type" would be a more correct, though less informative, name for si.7
for s1 = 101. Hence, optimal bids cannot be increasing in surplus.
The underlying problem is that there is no natural way to order signals in two-dimensions.
As a result, a one-dimensional statistic may not adequately rank bidders from low to high
valuations. This problem would not occur if a higher surplus signaled "good news" about the
value, i.e. when a higher surplus implies, on average, a higher value. Example 1 shows that this
property cannot be expected when the densities of cost and value signals are not unimodal. To
avoid problems of non-monotonicity and non-existence we shall restrict ourselves to the
following class of unimodal densities.
Assumption 2. The densities fv(v) and fc(c) are logconcave.
Logconcavity means that the (natural) log of the density is concave. This mild restriction is met
by many commonly used densities such as the uniform, normal, chi-square, exponential densities,
etc.
7 The next lemma shows that the assumption of logconcavity ensures that surplus and values
are positively correlated (see the Appendix for a proof).
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2, the conditional expectations E(v|s=x) and E(v|s£x) are non-
decreasing in x. Furthermore, E(c|s = x) and E(c|s£ x) are non-increasing in x.
We are now ready to derive the equilibrium bidding functions for our model, which is the topic
of the next section. We shall follow Milgrom and Weber (1982) who characterize the
equilibrium for standard auctions when bids are based on a single summary statistic. Since we
already determined how this summary statistic is constructed from the private and common value
signals, the derivation of the equilibrium bidding functions is fairly straightforward. Our main
interest, however, concerns the study of interesting economic phenomena such as the effects of
uncertainty, public release of information, and competition on efficiency and revenues.
7 See, for instance, Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) for a more extensive list and for applications of the logconcavity
assumption in models of oligopolistic competition.8
4. Equilibrium Strategies, Revenues, Winner’s Profit, and Total Surplus
We start with the first-price auction, then we consider the second-price auction and finally
the English auction.
8 Due to symmetry we can, without loss of generality, focus on bidder 1
whose surplus is given by s1 = v1/n-c1. Lower case letters are used to denote the highest surplus
of the (n-1) other bidders, e.g. y1 = maxj=2,...,n(vj/n-cj), and capital letters indicate order statistics
when they pertain to all n bidders, e.g. Y1 is the maximum of n surplus draws. To keep the
notation simple we only use one expectation symbol, e.g. the expected cost of the winner
E(cwinner)=E Y1(E(c|s=Y1)) is simply written as E(c|s=Y1). The proofs of the propositions in this
section can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. The n-tuple of strategies (B( ),...,B( )), where
is an equilibrium of the first-price auction.
(2)
Note that the optimal bids are functions of surplus, the summary statistic in our model. The
intuition behind (2) is as follows: the first term on the right side represents what the commodity
is worth (on average) to a bidder assuming that her surplus, x, is the highest and the second term
shows how much she "shades" her bid.
Next we turn to a second-price auction in which the highest bidder wins at the second
highest price. The optimal bid function for this case is the same as for the first-price auction
except that a bidder now assumes that she has the highest surplus and one other bidder has that
same surplus. The shade term on the right side of (2) therefore disappears.
Proposition 2. The n-tuple of strategies (B( ),...,B( )), where
is an equilibrium of the second-price auction.
(3)
8 We will not discuss the Dutch auction separately, since it is strategically equivalent to the first-price auction.9
Note the resemblance between (3) and Vickrey’s dominant strategy solution for the private value
second-price auction, i.e. bidding one’s value. When the expected value of the commodity
depends on others’ information, a dominant strategy no longer exists. Instead, a bidder’s optimal
strategy is to bid the expected value assuming she has the highest surplus and this surplus is
equal to the second highest surplus. To see this, note that if she bids less than (3) while others
bid according to (3), she could lose from bidders with a slightly lower surplus than hers and
forego some profit. Alternatively, if she bids higher than (3), she could win from bidders with
a slightly higher surplus than hers and pay too much, resulting in a negative profit.
Since our model contains the standard private value auction and common value auction
as special cases, it is interesting to see how bidding behavior in these familiar settings compares
with the results of Propositions 1 and 2. For instance, in the independent private values model,
increased competition leads to more aggressive bidding because an increase in the number of
bidders reduces the chance of winning. The opposite effect of the number of bidders on optimal
bids is predicted for the common value model, at least for some examples. The intuition is that
with more bidders, winning is more informative, i.e. an even stronger indication that the winner’s
signal was "too optimistic." Sometimes these contradicting comparative statics results are used
in empirical work to determine which model applies: private or common value (Paarsch, 1992).
In our model, in which bidders possess both private value and common value information, there
is no clearcut effect of increasing the number of bidders: optimal bids may increase, decrease,
or may be non-monotonic in the number of bidders. The procedure to classify the auction on the
basis of this numbers effect may therefore be less useful.
To get some insight into this result, consider a bidder with a low value and low cost
signal. With only one competitor, winning signals bad information about the other’s value and,
hence, about the value of the object for sale. In order not to fall prey to a winner’s curse, the
optimal bid has to take this adverse selection effect into account. In contrast, with an infinite
number of bidders, a bidder’s value signal becomes irrelevant and optimal bids are based on costs
only. In this case, the expected value of the object is simply its unconditional expected value.
So, with a low cost and value signal, the optimal bid is higher with an infinite number of bidders
than with two bidders. However, an analogous argument shows that bidders with high cost and
high value signals bid less with more rivals.10
Figure 1 illustrates the dependence of optimal bids on the number of bidders in a second-
price auction when values are uniformly distributed on [2, 3] and costs are uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]. The optimal bid decreases with n when (v, c) = (3, .1), is non-monotonic when (v, c)
= (2.4, .05), and increases with n when (v, c) = (2.3, .01). Notice that the ranking of bidders may
change with the number of bidders, e.g. the bidder with (v, c) = (3, .1) outbids the other two
when n £ 8 but has the lowest bid when n ³ 12. Hence, the introduction of new bidders may
change the winner of the auction and make it more efficient (see section 7), even when these
bidders themselves have no chance of winning. The intuition behind this result is that when more
bidders enter the auction, the common value signal becomes less important, which exemplifies
the cost differences between firms and makes an efficient outcome more likely.
Our derivation of the optimal bidding functions for the English auction follows Milgrom
Figure 1. Optimal bids in a second-price auction.
and Weber (1982). In the variant we consider, the auctioneer continuously raises the price and
bidders publicly reveal when they withdraw from the auction. Bidders who have dropped out11
are not allowed to reenter. With only two bidders, a bidder’s strategy is described by a single
number that indicates how high the bidder is willing to go before conceding: the English auction
with two bidders is equivalent to a second-price auction. However, with more than two bidders
the prices at which some bidders drop out convey information to those who remain active.
Suppose k bidders have dropped out at bid levels b1 £ ... £ bk. Bidder 1’s strategy can be
described by functions Bk(s1;b1,...,bk) which specify how high bidder 1 is willing to bid given that
k bidders dropped out at levels b1,...,bk (and given her surplus s1). The equilibrium strategy
B()=( B 0 ( ),...,Bn-2( )) is then defined recursively.
Proposition 3. The n-tuple of strategies (B( ),...,B( )), with B( ) defined in (4), constitutes an
equilibrium of the English auction.
The intuition for (4) is straightforward: given her surplus and the information conveyed in others’
(4)
drop-out levels, the highest a bidder is willing to go is given by the expected value of the
commodity assuming that all other active bidders have the same surplus. For instance, consider
the bid function B0(s1) which pertains to the case when no bidder has dropped out yet. If all
other bidders were to drop out at level B0(s0), then bidder 1’s expected payoff is: s1 +( n -1)/n
E(v|s=s0)-B 0(s 0)=s 1+(n-1)/nE(v|s=s0)-E(v-c|s=s 0)=s 1-s 0 . Using the bidding strategy B0, bidder
1 remains active until she is indifferent between winning or quitting. Similar interpretations can
be given for the Bk with k ³ 1; the only difference is that these functions take into account the
information conveyed in others’ drop-out levels.
We end this section with a "revenue and efficiency equivalence" result. Our model
predicts that the seller’s profit is the same for all standard auctions thereby providing a more
general setting for which Vickrey’s celebrated revenue equivalence result holds. Interestingly,12
our model also predicts that efficiency is the same for all standard auctions.
9 One might have
expected that an English auction would be more efficient than a sealed-bid auction. In an
English auction, part of the uncertainty about the common value is resolved as the remaining
bidders observe the price levels at which low-surplus bidders drop out. These price levels reveal
their surpluses and thus provide information about their value signals. In the final stage of the
English auction with only two active bidders left, all but one of the surpluses have been revealed,
allowing for more precise beliefs about the common value. However, for the remaining uncertain
part it is still the case that the bidder with the higher surplus makes the higher bid. Thus, the
first-price, second-price, and English auctions are efficiency equivalent because in all three
auctions the bidder with the highest surplus wins.
Proposition 4. In all three auctions, the total expected surplus generated is W=E(V)-E(cwinner),
the winner’s expected profit is pwinner = E(Y1) - E(Y2), and the auctioneer’s expected revenue is
R= W -(E(Y1) -E(Y2)).
In words, the expected total surplus generated by the auction is equal to the expected value of
the common value minus the winner’s expected cost and the winner’s expected profit is the
expected difference between the highest and second-highest surplus draw. The expected revenue
for the auctioneer is simply the difference between expected total surplus and the winner’s profit.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on policies aimed at increasing the efficiency and
revenue of auctions. In sections 6 and 7 we consider the effects of public information disclosure
and increased competition. First, we determine how the degree of uncertainty about the common
value affects efficiency.
9 We do not want to stress these equivalence results since they are sensitive to the specific assumptions underlying
our model. For instance, it is well known that affiliation and risk aversion destroy revenue equivalence (see Milgrom and
Weber, 1982, for revenue comparisons with affiliated signals, and, e.g. Holt, 1980, for the implications of risk aversion
for revenues). Efficiency equivalence will most likely not hold for the "traditional" formulation of the common value.
(We conjecture that in this case the English auction will be more efficient. This is hard to verify because, so far, it has
been impossible to derive the optimal bidding functions for the traditional formulation when bidders receive more than
one signal.) In contrast, our results pertaining to the effects of uncertainty, the release of information, and increased
competition on efficiency and revenues are all robust.13
5. The Effects of Uncertainty
In the previous section we have shown that in all three auctions the bidder with the
highest surplus wins. Since this bidder is not necessarily the one with the lowest cost, this
creates the possibility of inefficiencies. In this section we determine the magnitude of the
possible loss in efficiency and demonstrate that more uncertainty about the common value leads
to a greater loss. Furthermore, we show that more uncertainty results in higher profits for the
winning bidder.
A natural efficiency measure is the total expected surplus of the auction W =E ( V )-
E(c|s=Y1), the pie to be divided by the winning bidder and the auctioneer. A convenient way
to parameterize the uncertainty about the common value is to define the surplus variable s(a)=
av/n-cwhich results by scaling the value signal by a> 0. Since the analysis presented below
only involves surplus differences, additive constants cancel out. The effect of scaling the values
by a is therefore the same as a "mean-preserving" transformation of the values.
10
First, we determine the probability that the low-cost bidder wins the auction as a function
of a. Intuitively, when surplus contains no information about costs this probability is 1/n while
it should be 1 when surplus and costs are perfectly correlated.
Proposition 5. The probability P(a) that the low-cost bidder wins the auction is decreasing in
a with P(0) = 1 and lima®¥P(a) = 1/n.
Proof. P(a) is given by Prob[s1(a) = maxj=1,..,nsj(a)|c 1= minj=1,..,n cj], or
The top expression makes it clear that P(0) = 1 and the bottom expression shows that P(a)i s
decreasing in a with lima®¥P ( a )=1 / n . Q.E.D.
10 The correct mean-preserving transformation takes the form v ®av+(1-a)E ( v ).14
Depending on the relative variance of the value and cost signals, the allocation that results from
the auction thus ranges from "fully efficient" to "no more efficient than a random allocation."
The probability of winning, however, is not necessarily a good measure of inefficiency: even
when the lowest-cost bidder does not receive the commodity, the expected cost of the winner
could still be very low so that the loss in efficiency is small. The next proposition shows that
the winner’s expected cost rises with the uncertainty about the common value.
Proposition 6. The expected cost of the winner, E(cwinner)=E(c|s(a)=Y 1(a)), is increasing in a.
Proof. Let a1 > a2 > 0. Suppose, without loss of generality, that s1(a1) = maxj=1,..,n sj(a1) and
sk(a2) = maxj=1,..,nsj(a2). There are two cases to be considered. If k = 1, the costs are the same
for both a’s. If k ¹ 1, we have: a1v1/n - c1 > a1vk/n - ck and a2vk/n - ck > a2v1/n - c1 (ties occur
with probability zero). Dividing the first inequality by a1 and the second by a2 and adding the
result yields: c1/a1 + ck/a2 < c1/a2 + ck/a1, or, equivalently, ck (1/a2 -1 / a 1 )<c 1(1/a2 -1 / a 1 ).
Hence c1 > ck when k ¹ 1. In other words, for some realizations of the value and cost signals,
the winner’s cost is less for a = a2 than for a = a1, while it is the same for other realizations.
A fortiori, the expected winner’s cost (i.e. the winner’s cost averaged over all possible
realizations of the value and cost signals) is less for a = a2. Q.E.D.
Finally, we show that the winner’s profit is non-decreasing in the uncertainty about the
common value.
11 The basic intuition is that with less uncertainty the winner’s curse problem
is softened, which leads to more aggressive bidding and hence to lower profits (the proof can be
found in the Appendix).
Proposition 7. The winner’s expected profit, pwinner=E(Y1(a))-E(Y2(a)), is non-decreasing in a.
11 It is important to point out that this result is caused by an increase in the variance of the value signals, not by
an increase in the level. Proposition 7 also holds for the mean-preserving transformation v®av+(1-a)E(v), since adding
a constant to all values does not affect profits. Given that total expected surplus decreases under such a mean-preserving
transformation of the values (Proposition 6), and the winner’s profit is at worst the same, the auctioneer’s revenue has
to fall with more uncertainty.15
One nice interpretation of our model is that it provides a continuous parameterization from a
private values model at one extreme (a = 0) to a pure common value model at the other extreme
(a = ¥). Recall from the previous section that with n bidders, surpluses are defined as s=v/n-c,
so that an increase in the number of players has the same effect as reducing a. In other words,
the auction becomes more and more like a private value auction when competition increases.
We will return to this point in section 7. Propositions 5 and 6 show that for the realistic case
of a > 0, full efficiency can no longer be expected. In fact, it is straightforward to verify that
the drop in expected total surplus, or equivalently, the increase in the winner’s expected cost is
E(c1 )-E(c 1|c 1=minj=1,..,ncj) when a increases from 0 to ¥. Especially when there are relatively
more high-cost bidders (i.e. with a skewed cost distribution) the efficiency loss can be substantial.
In the next two sections we discuss factors that have a positive effect on efficiency and revenue.
6. The Effects of Information Disclosure
In this section we investigate the effects of public information release on bidding
behavior, revenues, and efficiency. Positive effects of the disclosure of this information for both
revenue and efficiency can be expected since it reduces uncertainty about the common value,
which diminishes the winner’s curse, and hence leads to more aggressive bidding. Consequently,
the expected profit of the winning bidder stays at best the same. Furthermore, a reduction in the
uncertainty about the common value results in a higher expected total surplus and since the
winner’s profit does not increase, the auctioneer’s expected revenue goes up. We show that these
positive effects are stronger when the auctioneer’s information becomes more precise.
In particular, we consider the case in which the auctioneer publicly announces her own
private signal v0 about the common value V. Under the assumption that the precision of this
signal is the same as those of the bidders, the common value changes as follows:
The effect of this extra piece of information on bidders’ strategies is most easily determined by
(6)
defining a new surplus variable s¢ = v/(n+1) - c. With this new definition the results of section16
4 can be applied without difficulty.
12 In other words, the expressions for profits, total surplus,
and revenues are the same as before, with the surplus signals and the order statistics appropriately
redefined. The effects of this redefinition are easily established using Propositions 6 and 7.
Proposition 8. Public disclosure of the auctioneer’s information increases total expected
surplus, increases expected revenue, and does not raise the winner’s expected profit.
Proof. Let a1 =1 / nand a2 = 1/(n+1). The difference between total expected surplus with and
without the auctioneer’s signal is given by: [E(V)-E(c|s(a 2)=Y1(a2))] - [E(V)-E(c|s(a 1)=Y1(a1))],
and the surplus result thus follows easily from Proposition 6. Since total expected surplus
increases and the winner’s profit does not increase by Proposition 7, the auctioneer’s expected
revenue increases. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this proposition is that the information given by the auctioneer
reduces the uncertainty about the common value. The reduced uncertainty makes the private
value component (i.e. the cost signal) more important, which raises the chance that a low-cost
bidder wins. At the same time, the reduced uncertainty will lead to more aggressive bidding and
thus to higher revenues for the auctioneer.
13
So far, we have only considered the case in which the auctioneer’s signal, v0,i so ft h e
same quality or precision as the signals of any of the bidders. In many situations, however, the
12 For example, in the first-price auction the optimal bidding function reads: B(x)=v 0/(n+1)+n/(n+1)E(V|Y1¢=x)-
E(c|s¢ = x) -E(Y1¢-y1¢ |Y1¢ = x), and similar changes occur for the second-price and English auction. The total surplus
conditional on the signal v0 equals the expected value of the commodity to the winner. As before, this is given by the
first two terms of B(x) evaluated at x = Y1¢ :
Since E(v0)=E ( V ), the unconditional total expected surplus is W =E ( V )-E ( c | s ¢ = Y 1 ¢). Similarly, the winner’s profit
becomes pwinner =E ( Y 1¢)-E ( Y 2 ¢) and the auctioneer’s revenue is R = W - pwinner.
13 One may wonder whether a truthful report is in the auctioneer’s best interest. Milgrom and Weber (1982) present
theoretical arguments why no reporting policy leads to a higher expected revenue than the policy of always reporting
honestly. Ashenfelter (1989) provides empirical evidence that auctioneers’ price estimates of impressionist paintings are
"very highly correlated with the actual prices fetched" and that the estimates are "very close to unbiased."17
auctioneer may be better informed about the commodity’s true value. A natural way to model
this is to weigh the auctioneer’s signal by a factor l > 1. The expression for the common value




Proposition 9. An increase in the quality of the auctioneer’s information leads to higher
expected total surplus, higher expected revenue, and does not raise the winner’s expected profit.
Proof. Define a1 = 1/(n+l1) and a2 = 1/(n+l2) with l2 > l1. The proof is analogous to that of
Proposition 8. Q.E.D.
7. The Effects of More Competition
In this section we investigate what happens when more bidders enter the auction. The
effect of increased competition can be treated along the same lines as the release of public
information in the previous section. With n + 1 bidders, the common value is given by (1) with
1/n replaced by 1/(n+1) and with one signal added. Defining the surplus variable s¢ = v/(n+1)- c,
the results of section 4 translate as follows: total expected surplus is W =E ( V )-E ( c | s ¢ = Y 1¢), the
winner’s profit is pwinner =E ( Y 1¢)-E ( Y 2¢), and the auctioneer’s revenue is R = W - pwinner, where
the order statistics are now based on n + 1 draws. The effect of one more bidder on total surplus
is therefore twofold: the surplus variable is redefined (which has a positive effect on efficiency,
see section 6) and the number of draws is increased. To isolate the latter effect, we shall
consider the case of n+1 bidders whose surpluses are the same as when there are n bidders. Let
s¢(a)=a v /(n+1) - c in which the values are scaled by a factor a, then s¢(a0)=sfor a0=(n+1)/n.
The proof of the next lemma can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. En+1(c|s¢(a0)=Y1¢(a0)) £ En(c|s=Y1).
14 This formulation can be motivated as follows: consider the case in which the variance of the bidders’ signals
is s
2
b (the same for all bidders) and the variance of the auctioneer’s signal is s
2
s. The "best" (i.e. unbiased and smallest
variance) estimator of the commodity’s value is then given by V =( lv 0+S
n




s is a measure
of the (relative) quality of the auctioneer’s information.18
Lemma 2 shows that with one more bidder the expected cost of the winner falls even when the
uncertainty about the common value is increased by scaling the value signals by a0 =( n +1)/n.
The next result should therefore come as no surprise.
Proposition 10. Total expected surplus increases with the number of bidders and attains its
maximum value, E(V)- cL , in the limit as the number of bidders goes to infinity.
Proof. From Proposition 6 and Lemma 2: En+1(c|s¢=Y1¢)<E n+1(c|s¢(a0)=Y1¢(a0)) £ En(c|s=Y1).
Since W =E ( V )-E ( c | s = Y 1), the first part of the proposition follows. When n®¥, surplus reduces
to -ci,s ol i m n®¥E n ( c 1 | v 1 / n-c 1 = maxi=1,..,n (vi/n - ci)) = limn ®¥E n ( c 1 | c 1= mini=1,..,n ci)=c L. Hence,
the limit value of the total expected surplus is W=E ( V )-c L. Q.E.D.
The effect of one more bidder on the winner’s profit and the auctioneer’s expected
revenue can be dealt with similarly. We scale the values by a0=(n+1)/n to isolate the effect of
one more draw and then we take into account the effect of the surplus redefinition. The winner’s
profit can be written in terms of the (inverse of the) hazard rate h(x) = (1-Fs(x))/fs(x) (see, for
instance, McAfee and McMillan, 1987):
First, consider the transition from n to n + 1 bidders while scaling the value signals by a0 so that
(7)
the definition of a bidder’s surplus remains the same. The winner’s expected profits are then
given by (7) with F
n replaced by F
n+1. Since logconcavity ensures that the inverse hazard rate,
1/h(x), is everywhere non-decreasing (see Lemma A2 in the Appendix) and F
n+1 first-order
stochastically dominates F
n, the resulting profit is no higher than (7). Combining this result with
Proposition 7, shows that the winner’s profit does not rise with the number of bidders. With
higher total surplus and winner’s profits that are at most the same we conclude:
Proposition 11. Increased competition raises the auctioneer’s expected revenue and does not
raise the winner’s expected profit.19
Interestingly, the effect of one more bidder on efficiency and revenues is greater than the effect
of information disclosure by the auctioneer, at least when the auctioneer’s signal is not more
precise than a bidder’s signal. Both lead to the same redefinition of the surplus (s = v/n - c is
replaced by s¢ = v/(n+1) - c) which has positive effects on revenues and efficiency since it
reduces the uncertainty of the common value. However, in the case of one more bidder there
is also one more value and cost draw, which further lowers the winner’s expected cost. When
faced with the choice to gather more information or to attract more bidders, a seller may want
to choose for the latter.
8. An Example
In this section we illustrate the effects of uncertainty, information disclosure, and
competition on efficiency with a specific example. In previous sections the private signal
represented a bidder’s cost but alternative interpretations are possible. For instance, the private
value could represent a bidder’s idiosyncratic taste for a painting while estimates of the resale
price add a common value part. Suppose each bidder receives signals (ti, vi) where ti³ 0i st h e
private value signal and vi ³ 0 is the common value signal. It is straightforward to adapt the
optimal bidding functions of section 4 for this case. Here we are mainly interested in the level
of achieved efficiency and we shall only need the fact that optimal bids are increasing functions
of v/n+t. Since the common value part is the same for all bidders, efficiency only depends on
the private value differences. For illustrative purposes we consider the following efficiency
measure that takes values between 0 and 100 percent:
where tmax, tmin, and twinner are the maximum taste draw, the minimum taste draw, and the winner’s
taste respectively.
15 The expected value of W is in general hard to compute since it is a ratio
15 Most efficiency results of this paper also hold for this measure: less uncertainty about the common value raises
W, the disclosure of the auctioneer’s information raises W, and W attains its maximum value of 100 percent when the
number of bidders goes to infinity.20
of stochastic variables, but W can be simulated easily. Consider the example when private values
are uniformly distributed on [7, 8] and the common values are uniform on [5, 10]. Figure 2
shows the attained efficiency level as a function of the number of bidders (bottom line), both
with the public announcement of the auctioneer’s signal (middle line), and one extra bidder (top
line).
16 The efficiency loss is substantial with only a few bidders and disappears as more
bidders enter the auction. As argued in section 7, the effect of increased competition is greater
than the public disclosure of the auctioneer’s information.
The effect of uncertainty about the common value is illustrated in Figure 3, where the
Figure 2. Efficiency as a function of the number of bidders.
expected efficiency level is plotted as a function of the number of bidders. The private value
signals are again uniformly distributed on [7, 8] and the common value signals are uniformly
16 Since the private value signals are symmetrically distributed the lowest possible level of efficiency is 50 percent.
When the auction is no more efficient than a random allocation, symmetry implies that the winner’s cost will, on average,
lie halfway between the minimum and maximum taste draw.21
distributed on [7, 8] (top line), [6, 9] (middle line), and [5, 10] (bottom line). Note that
Figure 3. Efficiency for various levels of uncertainty about the common value.
efficiency decreases when the uncertainty increases, even though the mean of the common value
distribution remains unchanged.
9. Conclusion
Currently many governments use auctions to allocate licenses for industries with
technically limited entry. The results reported in this paper temper an overly enthusiastic attitude
towards auctions: when the object for sale has both private and common value elements,
inefficiencies should be expected (see also Dasgupta and Maskin, 1999; Jehiel and Moldovanu,
1999). In all standard auction formats, bidders with a superior private value but a pessimistic
signal about the common value can lose against bidders with an inferior private value but an
optimistic common value signal. The magnitude of the efficiency losses depends on the degree
of uncertainty about the common value: more uncertainty implies a higher level of expected22
inefficiency. It is thus easy to construct (theoretical) examples that generate large inefficiencies.
We do not suggest, however, to abandon the use of auctions when allocating scarce rights
of entry. Only in the extreme case when the common value information completely overrides
the private value information, do auctions approach the more or less random allocation of
traditional methods like administrative procedures, lotteries, and "first come first serve." In this
sense, our analysis still supports McMillan’s (1995) argument that auctioning licenses to operate
in a market should be favored over such traditional methods. However, the auctioneer can and
should actively try to reduce expected inefficiencies. Our analysis provides two tools that raise
efficiency. First, the auctioneer can obtain an own estimate of the common value and the public
disclosure of this information increases expected efficiency. The higher the quality of the
auctioneer’s report, the higher the expected efficiency generated by the auction. Second, the
auction should be designed such that all potentially interested bidders indeed participate, since
more competition results in a more efficient allocation. These results are illustrated in Figures
2 and 3: efficiency losses can be substantial with only two or three bidders, but are negligible
with seven bidders or more.
Our results suggest a number of directions for future research. One (technical) extension
of our approach is to assume that value signals and/or cost signals are affiliated (Milgrom and
Weber, 1982). Affiliation can be seen as a (strong) form of positive correlation. The logic
spelled out in the first paragraph of section 3 also applies to the affiliated case: a bidder’s
expected payment and the probability of winning do not depend on a bidder’s cost or value signal
but only on her bid and the others’ bidding strategies. For the average formulation of the
common value, the way in which a bidder’s value and cost enter the expected payoff is in the
form of the surplus s = v/n -c. Hence, also in the affiliated case, optimal bids are functions of
a bidder’s surplus; the bidder with the highest surplus wins, and since this is not necessarily the
bidder with the lowest cost, inefficiencies can occur. In addition, Propositions 5 and 6 that
concern the degree of expected inefficiency do not hinge upon the independence assumption and
thus carry over to the affiliated case. This means that the effect of information disclosure by the
auctioneer and the effect of increased competition generalize. The revenue (equivalence) results,
however, are specific to the independence assumption.
In most of the auction literature, including this paper, the information available to23
individual bidders is exogenously determined. Persico (1999) considers a model with costly
information acquisition and shows that the auction institution itself may affect the level of
information accumulation. Persico’s work pertains only to the univariate (affiliated) signal case,
but the implications of his work for our model are intriguing. Indeed, if it is the case, as in
Persico (1999), that first-price auctions result in more information accumulation than second-price
auctions, they may well achieve a higher level of efficiency. This conjecture may be hard to
prove since auctions in which bidders possess different amounts of information are notoriously
hard to analyze, but initial results from simple two-bidder auctions are encouraging.
In situations where the same set of bidders interacts repeatedly, it is possible that social
ties develop between bidders which might lead them to work together. Our static model does
not address the possibility of collusion among the bidders.
17 It would be interesting, however,
to determine the effects of collusion in our model: suppose bidders can find a mechanism to
truthfully communicate their information (private and common value) to the other members of
their bidding ring. Paradoxically, this may improve efficiency for two reasons. First, each
bidding ring selects among its members the bidder with the best private value, thus lowering the
chance that a bidder with an inferior value wins the auction. Second, when members of a
bidding ring pool their information about the common value, the uncertainty about the common
value diminishes, which further mitigates the possibility of inefficiencies. On the other hand,
collusion also implies that there are fewer bidders, which has a negative effect on efficiency.
Our results have implications for structural econometric models of auctions (e.g. Laffont,
Ossard, and Vuong, 1995). Such models start with the equilibrium bidding functions for either
the private or common value case and use data on winning bids to determine the distribution of
bidders’ values. This information can be used by the seller to determine the optimal reservation
price. Our approach may prove useful in finding the right specification, i.e. correct bidding
functions, for auctions with multi-dimensional signals.
17 See, for instance, Graham and Marshall (1987) for an analysis of collusion in second-price and English auctions
with private values. McAfee and McMillan (1992) consider collusion in first-price auctions and McAfee et al. (1989)
discuss collusion in a common value setting. Robinson (1985) investigates the stability of bidding rings for various
auction forms. Krishna and Morgan (1997) study the effects of joint bidding in a common value auction using the average
formulation for the common value employed in this paper.24
Finally, the techniques developed in this paper can be applied in the analysis of other
situations of economic interest. For instance, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) argue that both
private and common value aspects play a role in elections: voters’ preferences over candidates’
positions constitute a private value component, while the "quality" of the candidate can be
interpreted as a common value element. Likewise, when money is being spent on a public good
such as national defense, the private tastes of those living close to a base may differ from the
common preference for protection and stability. In Cournot market games, firms’ costs are
private while the level of demand forms a common value element. In this case, a firm that is
overly optimistic about demand may produce more than a more efficient rival. In any of these
examples, the approach of this paper facilitates the analysis of equilibrium behavior in the
presence of private and common values.25
Appendix: Proofs
Below we shall need the following properties implied by logconcavity.
Lemma A1. If f(x, y) is logconcave then so are its marginals f(x) and f(y).
Proof. See An (1998).
Corollary A1. The density fs(s) is logconcave in s.
Proof. The joint density of v and s is given by f(v, s)=f v ( v )f c ( v / n - s ). It is straightforward to
verify that under Assumption 2 the Hessian of log(f(v, s)) is negative semi-definite, i.e. f(v, s)i s
logconcave. Lemma A1 thus implies that fs(s) is logconcave. Q.E.D.
Lemma A2. The hazard rate, h(x) = f(x)/(1-F(x)), of a logconcave density, f(x), is everywhere
non-decreasing.
Proof. Let f(x) be logconcave then
where the first inequality follows since logconcavity of f implies that f´(x)/f(x) is non-increasing
in x,s of ´(x)/f(x) ³ f´(t)/f(t) for all t ³ x. It is straightforward to rewrite the above equation as:
(f(x)/(1-F(x)))´ ³ 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma A3. Let X and Y be random variables. The conditional expectation E(Y|X£x) satisfies
Proof. Write the conditional expectation E(Y| X £x)a s
Differentiating the right side with respect to x yields the desired result. Q.E.D.26
Proof of Lemma 1. Since f(v|s)=f v ( v )f c( v / n - s )/fs(s), logconcavity of fc( ) is equivalent to
This means that ¶slog(f(v|s)) = ¶sf(v|s)/f(v|s) is increasing in v, or, ¶sf(v1|s)/f(v1|s) ³¶ sf ( v 2| s )/f(v2|s)
for all v1 ³ v2. This inequality can be rewritten as ¶s (f(v1|s)/f(v2|s)) ³ 0. Hence, for all s1 ³ s2
we have f(v1|s1)/f(v2|s1) ³ f(v1|s2)/f(v2|s2).
18 Since this is true for all v1 ³ v2, it remains true if we
integrate v1 from v to vH and integrate v2 from vL to v, which yields (1 - F(v|s1))/F(v|s1) ³
(1 - F(v|s2))/F(v|s2), or, F(v|s1) £ F(v|s2). In other words, F(v|s1) first-order stochastically
dominates F(v|s2), which implies E(v|s1) ³ E(v|s2) for all s1 ³ s2.S o E ( v | s = x ) is non-decreasing
in x. Lemma A3 applied to X = s, Y = v yields: ¶x E(v|s£ x)=( E(v | s=x )-E(v|s£x))fs(x)/Fs(x),
which is non-negative since E(v|s = x) is non-decreasing in x. The proofs for the conditional
expectations of the cost are similar. Q.E.D.
Below we use the following notation. The conditional density of y1 given y1 £ s is: fy1(x|y1 £ s)
= fy1(x)/Fy1(s)=( n -1) fs(x) Fs(x)
n-2 /Fs(s)
n-1 for x £ s, and the corresponding distribution function
is Fy1(x|y1 £ s)=F s( x )
n-1 /Fs(s)
n-1.
Proof of Proposition 1. An equivalent way to write (2) is: B(x)=( n -1)/n E(v|s£x)+E ( y 1| y 1£ x )
and its derivative is easily derived from Lemma A3: B¢(x)=(n-1)/n(E(v|s=x)-E(v|s£x))fs(x)/Fs(x)
+( x-E ( y 1| y 1£ x )) fy1(x)/Fy1(x). The last term is positive (the event y1 =x occurs with probability
zero) and the first term is non-negative by Lemma 1. Hence, B( ) is increasing. Suppose that
bidders 2,...,n bid according to (2). Bidder 1’s expected profit is:
From Lemma A3, the derivative of the expected profit with respect to b evaluated at b = B(x) is:
Using the expression for B¢ derived above it is straightforward to verify that the term in the
brackets equals s1 - x. Together with monotonicity of B( ) this shows that B(s1) is bidder 1’s
unique optimal bid. Q.E.D.
18 In other words, f(v|s) satisfies the monotone likelihood property, see Milgrom (1981).27
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that (3) is equivalent to: B(x)=x+1/nE(v|s=x)+(n-2)/nE(v|s£x).
The last two terms are non-decreasing in x (Lemma 1), so B( ) is increasing. Assume that
bidders 2,...,n bid according to (3). Bidder 1’s expected payoff is:
The second term in the brackets on the right side represents the sum of the values of bidders 2
to n given that their surpluses are less than B
-1(b). An equivalent way of writing this term is by
choosing one of them to have the highest surplus, y1 £ B
-1(b), while the n - 2 others have
surpluses less than or equal to y1. The expected profit then becomes
Together with monotonicity of B
-1( ) this proves that the unique optimal bid is B(s1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that each Bk is strictly increasing in x. Suppose bidders 2,...,n bid
according to (4). When bidder 1 wins the auction her expected profit is: s1 +1 / nå
n-1
j=1E(v|s=sj+1)
- Bn-2(s2), where the sj are the realizations of the others’ surpluses arranged in increasing order,
i.e. s2 ³ ... ³ sn. Using the definition of Bn-2 the expected payoff can be written as: s1 +1 / n
E(v|s=s2)-2/nE(v|s=s2)+E(c|s=s 2)=s 1-s 2. So bidder 1’s expected profit is positive only when
she has the highest surplus, and using B( ) she wins iff s1 = Y1. Hence, B( ) is the optimal
bidding strategy for player 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Expected total surplus equals the winner’s valuation of the commodity:
so W =E ( s | s = Y 1 )+( n -1)/n E(v|s£Y1)=1 / nE(v|s=Y1)+( n -1)/n E(v|s£Y1)-E ( c | s = Y 1 ). The first
two terms represent the expected value of the commodity given that one bidder has the highest
surplus and the others have lower surpluses: this is just E(V). Hence W =E ( V )-E( c|s=Y 1).
The Envelope Theorem implies that the derivative of the equilibrium profit p
*(s)=
p
e ( B ( s )) with respect to a bidder’s surplus s equals the equilibrium probability of winning. When
surpluses are i.i.d. across bidders the equilibrium probability of winning is simply Fs(s)
n-1 and the




n-1dx. This is the expected equilibrium profit of a28
bidder with surplus s in any of the three auctions discussed above. The ex ante expected
equilibrium payoffs accrue to the winning bidder, so
where the last expression is obtained by changing the order of integration. Partially integrating
this expression yields: pwinner =E ( Y 1 )-E ( Y 2 ). Finally, revenue is the difference between total
surplus and the winner’s profit: R = W - pwinner = W-E ( Y 1)-E ( Y 2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. The distribution function, Fs(a)(x), of s(a)=a v / n-cis given by
from which it follows that dFs(a)(x)/da =-1 / nE(v|s(a)=x) fs(a)(x) £ 0, i.e. the distribution
Fs(a)( ) is stochastically increasing in a. The difference between the first and second order
statistic is:
Differentiating this expression with respect to a yields
Lemma 1 together with Y1(a) ³ Y2(a) ensures that the right side is non-negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
and
The result follows since F
n+1( ) first-order dominates F
n( ) and E(c|s=x) is non-increasing in x.29
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